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LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO
THE BAR'
BERNARD C. GAVIT*
It would seem that the necessity of an adequate legal education as a prerequisite for admission to the Bar should have
become an accepted standard of individual and public conduct.
It would seem that to defend or expound the validity of such a
standard ought to be "wasted energy": that one ought to be able
to assert that "the proposition is so well settled that the court
does not feel called upon to cite authority to sustain it."
The truth is, however, that there is respectable (but in all
kindness, mistaken) opinion to the contrary. Each attempt to
amend the Indiana Constitution to specifically allow the use of
such a standard in passing on applications for admission to the
Bar has disclosed some persons actively opposed to the proposed
change "upon principle." The present time is no exception, and
we find some lawyers, judges and laymen more or less actively
opposed to any amendment to the constitution or any legislation
or judicial action looking to such a change.
It has, therefore, been thought desirable to re-examine the
proposition, with the hope of convincing both those who are
opposed, or uninterested, and to place the arguments and data
for the affirmative of the proposition before the lawyers and
citizens of the State.
So far as I know no one has been officially appointed to reply
to these arguments. It is necessary, therefore, for me to state
the views of the opposition. But I hasten to assure you that I
have no illusion that I have thereby any real advantage. I
appreciate that this is a gathering of free American Lawyers,
enslaved with the idea that nobody shall be permitted to get
* See biographical note, p. 109.
1 Read before the Indiana State Bar Association meeting at Blooming-

ton, Indiana, July 10th and 11th, 1930.
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away with anything, nor shall he be permitted to do all of the
talking, especially for both sides.
But so far as I have been able to discover the arguments
against an adequate legal education as a requirement for admission to the Bar are these:
1. We have got along without it for more than a hundred
years: why change?
2. It was unneeded eighty years ago: therefore it is unneeded now.
3. It necessarily fails to take care of the exceptional individual who might become a valued lawyer and citizen were he permitted to pursue his ambitions unhindered by such a requirement.
4. It creates a monopoly.
5. Upon principle it is fundamentally wrong.
When this subject was assigned to me last winter it was assumed that the citizens of the state would be voting on a constitutional amendment providing for educational qualifications
for admission to the Bar. Since that time it has been settled
that because of defects in the legislative action proposing the
amendment the question will not be submitted to the voters this
fall. And in view of the slight probability which exists as to
the calling of a constitutional convention it would almost seem
as if one might well plead a failure of consideration as to the
subject matter of this paper.
In reply, however, it is submitted that the subject is of present
interest to the Bar and public, and if it is not it ought to be.
For the fact is that for some time a committee of this Association has been at work preparing a bill to be submitted to the
legislature regulating admissions to and demissions from the
Bar.
A bill of this character will be presented to the next session
of the legislature; so that we are in truth faced with the task
of educdting ourselves and the public upon this subject.
Such a procedure (that is, legislative action)
necessarily involves a specific question of constitutional law, which must be
settled first. Our constitution provides that "Every person of
good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice." Does this take from
the legislature and the courts the power, which otherwise they
admittedly have, to regulate this subject to this extent?
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It is submitted that although there has been a quite general
assumption that that question must be answered in the affirmative, that a critical survey of the constitutional convention proceedings and the cases decided under this section, and of the
principles involved, results in the conclusion that the question
must be answered in the negative.
Two propositions falsely have been assumed to be true: first,
that the Constitutional Convention of 1850 and 1851 actually
intended to prohibit educational qualifications; second, that
"good moral character" today does not include an educational
qualification.
As to the first. So far as I can find no one has ever taken
the trouble to investigate the facts upon which the proposition
rests. As a question of constitutional interpretation I think we
must concede that in some instances the intention of the framers
of the constitution is material. When we have before us a question of legislative interpretation the pet phrase that the problem
involved is one of arriving at the legislative intent has little if
any substance to it. The rule is a starting point, or a point of
departure, rather than in any sense a rule of guidance. However, there seems to be a little more substance to it when a question of constitutional interpretation is involved, and (for the
sake of argument) it may be conceded that the actual specific
intention or purpose of the framers of the constitution might be
material. That is, the question is ("good moral character" being somewhat vague and ambiguous in its meaning), did the convention say the same thing as if it had said "good moral character and without any educational qualifications"? If we may
inquire if that were its actual intention (but embodied in the
shorter phrase "good moral character") we must seek evidence
of that intent in the proceedings of the Convention.
That is, we start out with the proposition that a constitutional
provision is to receive a fair interpretation, on the basis of the
language used. If the language does not have a settled or unambiguous meaning, the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention may be investigated for evidence to sustain one or the
other of possible meanings. That is, the court re-writes the
phrase to remove the ambiguity. The question is not, how would
the Convention have decided this case, but how would the Convention have expressed the principle involved had the ambiguity
been brought to its attention.
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Suppose then that we concede (for the sake of argument) that
the phrase in question is ambiguous within the meaning of the
rule, what evidence is there to aid in its proper re-drafting by
the court? The truth is that the evidence on the point is meager
and conflicting, but to my mind, if it proves anything at all it
disproves the common assumption on the point. I think that the
only fair inference as to the actual intention of the convention
is that it did not specifically intend to prohibit an educational
requirement for admission to the bar. Had the point been
specifically put to the convention it would not have re-written the
phrase to read "good moral character, but without educational
qualifications."
There are only two sources of information which can be considered legally, (and so far as I know they are the only actual
sources of information). These are the Journal of the Constitutional Convention and the Debates In The Constitutional Convention, both published under the authority of the convention.
They do not agree in all respects as to what transpired, but I
fail to see how any more credence can be given to one report than
the other. There is no express conflict in the reports (except in
one minor instance) : the disparity appears in one reporting proceedings which the other does not and this disparity is easily
accounted for. For the purpose at hand there seems to be no
recourse but to accept both reports as supplementing each other,
and we must deal with them as if each were accurate so far as
each goes.
In view of a reference in the convention to the existing law
on the subject it is well at this time to discuss it. It was governed by chapter 38, Sec. 90-114 of the Revised Statutes of 1843.
Sec. 90 provided that no person should be permitted to practice
as an attorney at law, without having first obtained a license
from two of the judges of the Supreme Court or from two circuit judges. The latter license did not permit practice in the
Supreme Court. Sec. 92 provided that "no person shall be entitled to receive a license until he has obtained a certificate from
the circuit court of some county of his good moral character."
The balance of the provisions deal with the recording of the
license, the taking of an oath, the penalties for violation of the
act and the powers and removal of attorneys. It is very apparent that the certificate as to good moral character was only
one condition to the grant of a license. There was a general
grant of power to the courts to grant licenses, without specify-
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ing any conditions and then later, and in a separate section of
the act there was a condition to the effect that the applicant for
a license obtain and present a certificate as to his good moral
character from some circuit judge (presumably) acquainted with
it. The result clearly would be that the courts had both inherent and implied granted power to impose any other reasonable
conditions they saw fit. That is, the law is that a general grant
of power to license, without specifying all of the conditions as to
its exercise vests in the licensing body discretionary power to
impose reasonable terms and conditions upon the evercise of it.2
There can be no question but that prior to 1852 ordinary good
moral character was but one of the qualifications for the practice
of the law, and the courts were free to, and undoubtedly did, exercise discretion as to the other qualifications of an attorney. As
we shall see we have a remark in the convention by a prominent
attorney which substantiates that interpretation of the act.
The convention assembled October 7, 1850, and adjourned
February 10, 1851. The provision in question did not come up
until rather late in the session. On January 18, 1851, Samuel
Frisbie, delegate from Perry County (he was a lawyer) 3 moved
the adoption of a resolution "that the committee on the practice
of law and law reform, be instructed to report a section, that
every free white male citizen of the age of twenty-one years,
and of good moral character, shall be permitted to practice law
in any and all courts of this state, whether of record or not of
4
record."
James W. Borden, chairman of that committee (delegate from
Allen County and a lawyer and judge of some consequence) 5
suggested that the resolution should go to the committee on
courts of justice. Several voices. "No. No. The subject belongs to law reform." The resolution was adopted.
The committee on law reform was composed of James W.
Borden, Chairman (Allen County, a lawyer); Joseph Ristine
(Fountain County, a lawyer and afterwards a judge) 6 ; Thomas
W. Gibson (Clark County, no information); Daniel Kelso
(Switzerland County, a lawyer and afterwards prosecuting at2

17 R. C. L. p. 527; L. R. A. 1915 C. p. 1097, et seq.

3 Vol. 3, Monks, Courts and Lawyers of Indiana, p. 1143.
4

Journal, p. 710-711; Debates, p. 1673.

5 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 319, 339, 540, 541, 548, 551, 647, etc.

6 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 343.
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torney) 7; Samuel Hall (Gibson County, a lawyer and judge of
some prominence) 8 ; David Wallace (Marion County, a lawyer,
former governor, legislator, congressman, and afterwards judge
of the Court of Common Pleas) 9 ; John S. Newman (Wayne
County, a lawyer, and later President of the Indiana Central
Railway)10; Grafton F. Cookerly (Vigo County, no information) ; Robert C. Kendall (White County, no information);
Joseph H. Mather (Elkhart County, a lawyer and former prosecuting attorney)"; Daniel Read (Monroe County, no information) ; Walter March (Grant and Delaware Counties, no information) ; William S. Holman (Delaware County, a lawyer, the
son of Jesse L. Holman, one of the three original justices of our
Supreme Court, a legislator, circuit judge and for thirty years a

member of Congress)

12.

Of the thirteen members of the committee which drafted the
section as it was finally adopted eight of them were lawyers, and
among them were included some of the most substantial and influential members of the convention.
On January 27th Mr. Borden reported the following section:
"Any person of good moral character and possessing the right of
suffrage, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this state," which report was concurred in and the section read a first time and passed to second reading.' 3 It is to be
noted that this section left out the provision of the original resolution concerning free white males, and put in that the person
was to be "entitled to admission to practice." As proposed the
section was that he be "admitted to practice." In view of later
action in the convention this change is very pertinent.
On January 31st the section was read a second time. Ross
Smiley (Fayette County, no information) moved to strike out
the words "be entitled to admission" and insert the words "have
a right". Mr. Thomas Butler (Green County, no information)
[in the debate it is Mr. Frisbie who makes this motion, and he
was the original proposer; and this is the only conflict in the reports in the Debates and the Journal] moved to lay the section
7 Monk's Opus. Cit. p. 559, 579, 787, 792, 893, 919, 981, 1031.
s Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 81.
9 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 79, 81, 91, 112, 338.
10 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 1209.
11 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 666, 817, 827, 833, 865, 952, 995.
12 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 187, 320, 337, 436, 642, 669, 687, 985, 1005, 1049.
13 Journal, p. 796, Debates, p. 1853.
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and amendment on the table. The amendment was tabled, and
the section passed to third reading. There was no discussion on
14
the proposed amendment.
Apparently one member at least thought there was some difference between "be entitled to admission" and "have a right"
to practice and the fair inference is that the committee thought
there was a difference; for it had changed the language from
"entitled to practice" to "entitled to admission to practice."
Whether the difference was thought to be one of substance or
of form it is impossible accurately to tell. One is left entirely
to inference, and that we shall discuss later.
The Debates report no other proceedings at this time, but the
Journal reports the following additional proceedings: Mr. John
Davis (Madison County, possibly a lawyer)' 5 moved to insert
after the word "suffrage" the words "and requisite qualifications."
Mr. Alexander C. Stevenson (Putnam County, no information)
moved a call of the previous question.
Mr. George W. Moore (Owen County, no information) moved
to lay the amendment on the table, which was decided in the
affirmative. The inference from this we shall also discuss later.
On February 1st the section was read a third time. The
Journal reports merely that it was passed by a vote of 84 to 27.16
The Debates report the following proceedings 17 : (And this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that because no further
official action was taken, the Journal quite properly omitted what
the Debates has properly included.) The section was read a
third time. (What follows is a verbatim copy of the Debates.)
Mr. Kelso (a member of the committee which drafted it, and a
lawyer) : "The section ought to be amended by the striking out
of two words, and I hope the convention will agree to the amendment by unanimous consent. The words are 'to admission'. The
section contemplates that there shall be an examination. I would
prefer that it should be in this form, that any man of good moral
character and possessing the right of suffrage shall be entitled
to practice in all of the courts of this state."
Several members: "Consent! Consent!"'
Journal,p. 860, Debates, p. 1961.
15 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 319.
1OP. 879.
17 Pp. 1971-72.
'4
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Mr. Kelso: "I do not care one farthing about it. Take the
section as it stands, it just amounts to what the law now is."
The President: "The gentleman will send up his amendment
in writing."
Mr. Kelso: "Yes, sir. I will send it up in writing."
I move that the section be re-committed with instructions to
strike out the words "to admission."
Mr. Borden (chairman of the committee and a lawyer of prominence) : "I ask whether it is the intention of this provision that
a man who knows nothing about the law at all, will be permitted
to come into court and practice law?"
A voice: "Lay members for instance."
Mr. Borden: "I move that the section be laid upon the table."
(Much confusion here prevailed throughout the chamber.)
Mr. Robert H. Milroy (Carroll County, a lawyer and judge)Is
demanded the previous question.
The demand for the previous question was seconded.
The main question was ordered to be now put.
The president (without noticing the motion of the gentleman
from Allen, Mr. Borden), said: "The main question is upon the
passage of the section."
A member: "I want the yeas and nays upon this question."
Mr. Schuyler Colfax (St. Joseph County, a newspaper man,
later congressman and vice-president of the United States)19:
"The previous question I think brings the convention to a vote
first upon the motion to recommit."
A voice: "There has been no motion to recommit."
Mr. Colfax: "There certainly was such a motion, and it was
made by the gentleman from Switzerland" (Mr. Kelso).
Mr. John Pettit (Tippecanoe County, a lawyer of great prominence; former U. S. District Attorney and congressman; later
a U. S. Senator; Chief Justice of Kansas and a member of the
Indiana Supreme Court) 20 : "The motion to recommit was made
to my certain knowledge."
Mr. Johnson Watts (Dearborn County; there were three John
Watts, who were lawyers and judges in this county, and this may
have been one of them) 21 : "I make a point of order. The gen18 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 582, 585, 590, 691, 755, 878, 960, 1073, 1127.

19 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 434.
20
Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 92.
21 Monks, Opus. Cit. p. 84, 628, 635, 712, 1151.
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tleman of the bar have no right to vote upon this question because they are personally interested."
The President (laughing) : "Members of the legal profession
will be excused from voting."
Mr. Thomas W. Gibson (a member of the committee): "I
would inquire whether an amendment could now be made, by
universal consent."
The President: "Not under the operation of the previous
question."
Mr. Gibson: "As the proposition at present stands, it gives
the right to practice law to any person."
A voice: "Possessing the right of suffrage."
"It strikes me that this is too broad."
The question then, according to ruling of the chair, being upon
the adoption of the section, the yeas and nays were taken. Yeas,
84; nays, 27. The section was referred to the committee on revision, arrangements and phraseology. 22 (Here ends the verbatim report from the Debates.)
Of the members of the convention heretofore mentioned Colfax, Cookerly (of the committee), Frisbie (the original proposer
of the section), Gibson (of the committee), Holman (semble),
Kelso (semble), Kendall (semble), March (semble), Smiley
(who had moved to substitute "right to" for "entitled to admission") voted for the section. It is to be noticed that Kelso,
Smiley and Gibson, who had wanted to amend the section nevertheless voted for it as it stood. Wallace and Hall were the only
members of the committee who voted against it; while Borden,
Ristime, Newman and Read, members of the committee, did not
vote.
On February 10, 1851, the committee on revision reported the
final draft 23 and the only change which had been made was that
"being a voter" was substituted for "and possessing the right of
suffrage" 2 4.

The convention had appointed a committee to prepare an exposition of the new constitution to be circulated among the people of the state. This "Address To The Electors" was presented
and approved February 8th.25 There was no word of explana22 Here ends the verbatim report from the Debates.
23 Debates, p. 2066.
24 Debates, p. 2073.
25 Journal, p. 963, Debates, p. 2042.
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tion offered on the section in question. It was merely set out in
2
the language of the constitution.
What was the actual intention of the convention? In view of
the fact that there was no argument: no attempt to explain the
purpose of the section, the only expressed intention is in the
language used. The actual intention or the specific purpose of
the convention on the proposition that the section must be rewritten to prohibit a requirement of legal education, is left to
inference and conjecture. The most unfavorable conclusion
which can be drawn from the proceedings is that the convention
had no specific intention or purpose on the subject, and we are
therefore driven to a fair interpretation of the language used.
On the other hand it would seem that the fair inference from
what transpired is that the committee and the convention did not
intend to make ordinary good moral character and voting the
qualifications to the implied exclusion of legal education.
It will be noted that as originally proposed the section was
aimed partially at least against any colored invasion of the bar,
for the convention was anti-negro and submitted sections prohibiting negro suffrage and negro immigration into the state
which were adopted. Too, on January 25th Mr. Watts proposed
a section providing that "every legal voter of good moral standing shall be allowed to practice law." A voice: "Did the gentleman say every negro voter?" Mr. Watts: "Yes, if the gentleman can find any." After some argument, directed primarily at
the good faith of Mr. Watts (it was offered as an additional section to the article on Reform and Procedure) the proposal was
27
withdrawn.
The section which was adopted was changed to leave out
"white male." But this change may have been made upon the
assumption that the constitution would prohibit negro suffrage,
and that the prohibition would therefore be in~luded in the word
"voter". Certainly there is something to be said, however, for
the proposition that originally the section may have been aimed
solely at negro lawyers.
What are the other inferences from what little was said about
it during the convention? It passed first reading without comment, although it had been changed by the committee. On second reading Ross Smiley (no information) moved to substitute
"have a right" for "be entitled to admission!' and thus restore the
26 Debates, p. 2044.
27 Debates, p. 1713, et seq.
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section substantially to its wording as originally proposed. It is
apparent that at least one member and the committee thought
there was a difference. It may have been thought to be only a
matter of form; or it may have been thought to be one of substance. But in ordinary parlance, "having a right" to do a thing
is the equal of its meaning in legal parlance. It means "right"
and not something less. It may be that in substance it means the
same as being "entitled to admission" to do a thing. I think Mr.
Smiley and the committee thought it did not. The reason is that
if it were merely a matter of form the change would not have
been suggested (so far as Mr. Smiley is concerned), for the procedure was on final adoption of any section to refer it to a committee on revision and phraseology. It would seem fair to infer
that at least this one individual thought as Mr. Kelso thought,
when he later stated that "to be entitled to admission" meant to
be entitled to take an examination for admission; and this by
inference is the position of the committee, for it had inserted the
phrase and as shown by the later proceedings the two members
of the committee who actually expressed a view stated that it
contemplated an examination. In any event if the convention
were so hostile to the legal profession as it sometimes represented, and was really intent on prohibiting legal education as a
qualification for admission to the bar, it seems quite reasonable
that it would have adopted Mr. Smiley's motion, and changed the
language from one of ambiguity to the ordinary mind, to one of
certainty. It would seem that the fair inference here is that the
convention was not intent on prohibiting legal education as a
qualification, and it was quite willing to allow an interpretation
to the contrary.
At this point the Journal reports that Mr. John Davis moved
to insert "and requisite qualifications." This apparently was to
make the section certain as against an interpretation that it did
not require a legal education. The amendment was tabled without discussion. What is the fair inference from this? It might
well be that the convention wished to exclude legal education as
a qualification; it could also well be that it thought the present
language plain enough to the contrary.
In view, however, of the fact that the convention immediately
prior to this had refused to ameind the section to make clear the
opposite meaning, and that it here refused to specifically add
these words, we give the opposition the benefit of every doubt
when we say that the fair inference is that it was willing to let
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the matter rest on the language as used. That is, it refused to
take either side. It was, in other words, willing at least to leave
the phrase "good moral character" open to future fair construction.
On third reading it is clear from what Mr. Kelso and Mr.
Borden said that both of those gentlemen, who were members of
the committee which drafted the section did not understand that
the section prohibited legal education as a qualification for admission to the bar. Mr. Kelso moved to strike out "entitled to",
because the section as written "contemplated an examination";
and he also expressed the view that the sections but stated the
existing law (which as we have seen clearly made good moral
character only one of the conditions for admission). And the
convention was against him. He had asked for unanimous consent to make the amendment; there were but several voices of
"consent". He then was also convinced that the convention was
against a change, for he said it made little difference, as the section stated the existing law. So here we have his opinion that
the existing law did require legal education; that the section contemplated an examination, and a record that the convention was
very definitely against a change to exclude it.
Mr. Borden expressed surprise that Mr. Kelso should wish to
amend the section in this manner and allow "a man who knows
nothing about the law at all" to practice law, and moved to table
the section.
Apparently there was quite a little excitement at this point in
the proceedings and the reporter states that the President overlooked both the proposed amendment and Mr. Borden's motion
and took a vote on the section as it was.
We have here the first and the only clear cut actual expression
in the convention, and it is emphatically to the effect that the
section did not exclude legal education; that an examination and
legal education could also, and presumably would be added b'y
the courts or the legislature.
And, this interpretation is by fair inference fastened upon the
convention as a whole. At this point if the convention did not
know it before it learned that the chairman of the committee
which drafted the section, and one of the members, both of them
lawyers, interpreted the section to be not exclusive of legal education in its requirements. Mr. Kelso mustered very little support for his amendment and finally the convention did nothing
to correct the chair and bring about a vote on Mr. Kelso's amend-
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ment. It seems wholly unlikely that if the convention was so
anti-educated-lawyer as has been assumed and asserted it would
not have taken the occasion again to change the section to meet
its mind.
On the other hand Mr. Gibson, a member of the committee,
apparently thought the language too broad, and desired to offer
some amendment to correct it, buthe was not permitted to do so,
the previous question having been voted. Whether he thought it
too broad on the voting provision, or on the other is not disclosed. If it were the latter it would seem that here again the
inferences are somewhat equal; Mr. Gibson's utterances counteracting that of Kelso and Borden. But in view of the fact that
the convention was in a position to act against Mr. Borden's and
Mr. Kelso's suggestion, and was in no position to sustain Mr.
Gibson's view, the more importance must be attributed to the
former.
In the Address To The Electors nothing is said about the section. The address does laud the section for the reform of procedure; and it would seem that if the convention thought it had
accomplished anything new in the section in question some advertising on that score would have been forthcoming also. Again
the inference is against the assumption that the purpose or result was to prohibit legal education as a qualification.
Although the inferences as to the actual intention of the convention are to a degree conflicting, certainly it can only be said
that the more in number and the more in reason support the
result that the convention did not intend nor purpose to specifically prohibit legal education as a qualification; and that on
the contrary it did intend to merely state the law as it was and
leave the qualifications in addition to voting and ordinary good
moral character to the courts and legislature. We might even
say that the section sets out the minimum and not the maximum
requirements, and means that if one does have those qualifications he can not be kept out for those reasons. As a practical
matter the section so construed means little, and is somewhat of
an idle gesture.
But that, of itself, is no conclusive argument against the interpretation. The truth is that the constitution was not framed by
masters of constitutional law. And other sections have been construed to be practically meaningless. The one which provides
that "all courts shall be open; and justice shall be administered
freely and without purchase" is a notable example.
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On the whole I think that result is not entirely satisfactory, if
for no other reason than that it is based on a specific intention
of the convention founded wholly on inference. But if we throw
it out for that reason, we must in the same heave throw out the
specific intention of the convention to the contrary, for there is
more evidence to support the first than there is to support the
latter.
So I think we can even be generous, take the weakest position
possible and admit that after all, if the specific intent and purpose here is material it is not to be discovered; or at least that
the information is so meagre that finally the inferences sink into
conjectures insufficient to prove either side of the argument (although they do favor the conclusion heretofore reached). Certainly there is no evidence which would justify a court in rewriting the section to read "good moral character, but without
legal education."
We then get back to the proposition that the problem is to be
settled by a fair construction of the language used; and after all
the convention seems to have adopted that attitude.
It is submitted that the section is susceptible to any one of
three interpretations. 1. It is a grant of a constitutional right
to any voter with good moral character to practice law. 2. It is
a limitation on the power of the courts and legislature to make
anything less than suffrage and good moral character the qualifications for admission to practice. That is, it sets a minimum
standard. 3. It is a limitation on the power of the courts and
legislature to make anything more than suffrage and good moral
character a qualification for admission to practice. That is, it
sets a maximum standard.
It really makes no difference which view is taken, because the
solution of the problem at hand turns in any event on the proper
meaning today of the phrase "good moral character." But it is
submitted that the third interpretation is the most reasonable
one, and is after all the one which has in a majority of the decided cases been placed upon the section.
If we take the first it is clear that such a right is no different
from any other right, and would be subject to reasonable regulation. It would, therefore, be competent for the legislature or the
courts, to define "good moral character" to include legal education and such a definition would certainly be a reasonable regulation. The fact that one's right or privilege is a constitutional
one, does not add much to its value as against an exercise of
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reasonable regulation by a proper body. For example it is well
settled that the right or privilege to engage in interestate commerce is subject to regulation; as is also the privilege of a nonresident to use the courts of a state under the privileges and immunities clause; as is also the right acquired under the patent
2
law. s
If we take the second nothing stands in the way of a similar
regulation, for the constitution sets only a minimum standard.
That is, it is a check on the power of the courts and legislature to
make something less than suffrage and good moral character a
test for admission. As has been suggested heretofore such an
interpretation is not impossible, nor even unreasonable, although
the practical result be to make the section a form of words inerely; but that interpretation is, as we shall see, possibly precluded
by the latest decisions of the Supreme Court.
The least that can be said as to the third interpretation is that
it has been tacitly accepted by the Supreme Court in the last two
cases.
The decisions under this section are very few and are as
follows:
In McCracken v. State29, the question arose as to whether an
act of 1865 prohibiting a county recorder from practicing law
was or was not in conflict with the section in question. It was
held that it was not for the reason that the act in question was
not a regulation of the qualifications of attorneys, but a regulation of the qualifications of recorders. The result is, of course,
that there is added to the constitutional qualifications, the legislative qualification that the person be not also a recorder, and
that the section is not exclusive. The reason given is facetious.
Whether the decision could be sustained upon the ground that
under a proper interpretation of the entire constitution, the
grant of power to regulate qualifications for public office was an
implied limitation on the section in question, is open to doubt.
So sustained, however, the decision has no bearing on the present
inquiry. Otherwise it is a distinct authority that the section sets
only minimum qualifications, and it is impliedly overruled by
later cases. But as it stands, if anything, it is an authority
for us.
The next case, Exparte Walls3 o, is a case of disbarment, but in
it "good moral character" is defined. The special findings in this
28 Pattersonv. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501 (1879).

29 27 Ind. 491, (1867).
30 73 Ind. 95 (1880).
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case disclosed that the attorney had robbed and cheated his
clients, but that in his business relations with others (not his
clients) he was honest and upright. In answer to the argument
that the latter was the test of his "good moral character" and not
the first, the court said: "It requires much more than mere honesty and uprightness in business relations outside of a profession, to constitute a good moral character. Such business relations might admit even of the grossest misconduct and immorality in the practice of his profession, and does not exclude even
crime." That is, good moral character here means character as
it affects the attorney's capacities as an attorney only. The decision belies the common assumption that "good moral character" as used in the constitution means solely a matter of ordinary and commonplace personal rectitude. Here is a decision
which says it means "character" as it affects attorney and client
and the public! The case is a valuable authority for us, and is
really about all the authority we need.
In In re Petition of Leach 3 ', the court held that a woman, although not a voter could be admitted. The reason given was
that the constitution "secured the right of the voter of good
moral character" but did not deny the right to one with less
qualifications. It takes the first interpretation suggested above.
I think it is a strained construction; but it contains nothing
against us, for admitting that the constitution gives a right to
every voter of "good moral character", such a right ought in any
event to be subject to reasonable regulations; and there is still
left over the proper interpretation of "good moral character."
In In re Denny3 2 , there was involved the question of the adoption of a constitutional amendment giving the legislature authority to regulate admission to practice. The Marion Circuit Court
had apparently adopted regulations for admission which included
an examination of some sort. It found that the applicant was a
person of good moral character and a voter but the applicant
refused to submit to the examination and as a conclusion of law
the court stated that he was not entitled to admission. The court
said "If the proposed amendment has not been adopted the conclusion of law and the judgment cannot be sustained."
The case decides either that there was a constitutional right
denied, or that the courts' regulations were invalid, being beyond
its jurisdiction. At best it is a weak authority, for it was ap31134 Ind. 665 (1893).
32156 Ind. 104 (1900).
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parently admitted, or assumed that the regulations were invalid
unless supported by the constitutional amendment; and all of the
argument was directed to the proposition as to the adoption of
the constitutional amendment. Apparently the attorneys for the
appellee were so confident of their proposition that the amendment had been properly adopted that they didn't argue the other
proposition; illustrating again the old truth that it is dangerous
business to carry all your eggs in one basket.
The case is in no sense a decision against us, for the trial
court specifically found that the applicant was a person of good
moral character. By no stretch of the imagination could it be
said to be decisive of a case where the court would find that he
was not a person of good moral character because he did not
possess an adequate knowledge of the law to permit him to honestly represent himself to be an attorney.
In In re Boszwel133, the same question was again presented. The
court says, "It appears from special findings of facts and conclusions of law made and stated by the trial court that the petitioner was possessed of all the qualifications necessary for admission to practice law under the provisions of the constitution so
long in force ... and it also appears ...

that the court refused

to admit the petitioner solely upon the assumption that the proposed amendment had been carried-thus leaving the court free
-to make rules requiring qualifications additional to those prescribed by the original constitutional provision, which it had
done, and with which the petitioner could not comply."
The case is no stronger than the Denny case. Both cases seem
to be on the theory that the constitution sets a maximum standard; and as a matter of constitutional interpretation that, on the
whole, seems to be the fairest construction to be placed on the
section. There is nothing in either case to the effect that the
applicant was kept out by reason of a lack of legal education.
For all that appears he may have been kept out for any number
of reasons, which could have nothing to do with his good moral
character as an attorney.
But if the assumption be that the application was denied on
the sole ground of a lack of legal education, again there is no
decision that after all such lack goes to the question of good
moral character. And even if it were so decided then, the cases
would not be controlling today, for "good moral character" is a
phrase with a changing content.
33179

Ind. 292 (1912).
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(There is nothing in any of the other cases material to the
issue. They turn on questions of procedure.)
And so we come to the crucial point in the case. It is submitted that there is no evidence that the convention intended that
"being a voter and having good moral character" should be forever read as "being a voter and having a good moral character,
and specifically having no legal education." In no event did it
intend to prohibit legal education as a qualification if it squared
with good moral character. And the question never is, as to how
the convention would have decided a specific case; for if it were,
"voter" then and "voter" now would necessarily mean the same,
although obviously they mean different things, for today a negro
may be a voter; but the convention would have had no trouble in
excluding him, because he was not a voter. The difference is between reading in something to clarify an ambiguous phrase, on
the ground of an actual intention; and asking how would the
convention or people have decided this particular case at that
time without reference to the language they used. That is, if the
phrase "entitled to admission to practice" if one has "good moral
character" is ambiguous, we may clarify it by evidence of what
the convention would have said had the ambiguity been called to
its attention, but as we have seen there at best is no reliable evidence upon which to base a redrafting of the section. The question then is, what is the fair interpretation today of the language
used; and the manner in which the convention might have decided the specific case before the court is wholly immaterial.
So the problem finally simmers down to what is meant by
"good moral character". It is clearly a phrase of changing content. There are few phrases in the constitution which mean today what they meant (in content) in 1852. No principle of constitutional construction is better established. In the case of
Weems v. United States34, Mr. Justice McKenna said this: "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not,
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had heretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They
are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to ap34

217 U. S. 349, 373.
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proach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach
it." The future is their care and provisions for events of good
and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot
be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other
rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as
it would be deficient in efficacy and power; Its general principles
would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in word might
be lost in reality and this has been recognized. The meaning
and vitality of the constitution have developed against narrow
and restrictive construction."
The justice goes on to point out the varying application of the
14th amendment, and only recently in the case of Ambler v.
Village of Euclid35 (where a general zoning ordinance was upheld) the court gives point to the principle by itself admitting
that twenty-five years before it most likely would have reached
an opposite result. Admittedly "due process of law" twentyfive years ago probably is not "due process of law" today (outside of the field of procedure).
In our own constitution the phrase "common schools" occurs.
In 1857 in the case of the City of Lafayette v. Jenners36 the Supreme Court says that an academy (or high school) was not a
"common school" within the meaning of the constitution. Today
it is conceded that the high schools of the state are part of the
"common schools" provided for by the constitution.3 7 And within the past few months our Supreme Court has very correctly
decided that what was "garbage" ten years ago is not "garbage"
today. 38 If such a lowly commodity as "garbage" is subject to
the changes brought about by science and business it ought to be
doubly apparent that "good moral character" can have a new
significance in keeping with the moral progress of the race. If
we are not tied to our grandfathers' ideas on garbage, by the
same sign we most certainly ought not to be tied to their ideas
on "good moral character" in an attorney.
The Weems case above is an excellent example for the purpose at hand. It involved the application of a clause in the conW5272 U. S. 365.
30610 Ind. 70, 78.

37 See Robinson v. Schenec, 102 Ind. 307 (1885), and State v. O'Dell,
187 Ind. 84 (1918).
Ws Jaisen Farins v. City of Indianapolis, 171 N. E. 199.
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stitution of the Philippines prohibiting cruel and inhuman punishment. The court reviews all of the cases and points out that
the phrase has received (on the whole) an enlightened construction. The courts do not, and ought not to, go back to inquire
what would the convention, or even the people of that time,
have thought of this: but the inquiry is, what is cruel and inhuman punishment as of this date, in the light of human views
on the subject at this time. Thus it is conceded, that whipping,
branding and capital punishment for minor offenses would
today be cruel and inhuman; although they were not in 1789.
Mr. Justice McKenna says this, 39 "The clause of the constitution
in the opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice." The court therein held an imprisonment of fifteen years
under ball and chain and hard labor, for a minor offense, to be
cruel and inhuman punishment. A court even fifty years before
would have had no difficulty in reaching an opposite result.
Can there be any doubt but that the phrase "good moral
character" is likewise one subject to a new meaning as public
opinion becomes more enlightened? I can find but one case
defining the phrase, as involved here. In In re Spenser,40 Mr.
Justice Deady said this (the question was as to the good moral
character of an applicant for citizenship) : "What is a 'good
moral character' within the meaning of the statute may not be
easy of determination in all cases. The standard may vary from
one generation to another, and probably the average man of the
country is as high as it can be set. In one age and country, duelling, drinking and gaming are considered immoral, and in another they are regarded as very venial sins at most."
Is it not true that public opinion can change and has changed
as to what constitutes good moral character in an attorney?
The test is not what would a court have done in 1852 nor even
in 1912, nor yet in 1929, it is, what is the proper application of
the section today?
And after all is it not true that in view of the comparative
ease with which a young man or woman can acquire a legal
education today, (the three hundred persons examined for admission to the bar in New York last year who did not have a
39 p.

378.

40 22 Fed. Cas. 92, Fed. Cas. No. 13234, 5 Sawy. 195.
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college education in preparation for their legal educdtion were
asked if they would have managed to get a college education had
it been required, and everyone answered "yes") that one who
wishes to practice without it shows a weakness of character;
shows further an absolute dishonesty, as measured by present
standards, so that we can unequivocably say that he does not
have a good moral character? We have no difficulty in saying
that an attorney who collects $100 belonging to his client, and
appropriates it to his own use is unfit to be an attorney. But
suppose he takes $100 from him upon the representation that
he is learned in the law, and although ignorant on the subject,
advises him as to his legal rights, whereby the client loses
$10,000, is he really not more of a criminal than in the first
illustration? Those of you who have had occasion to observe
the workings of carpenters, the railroad porters and the streetcar conductors who have been admitted to practice law, simply
because so far they had had no occasion to steal from a client
and they had therefore a so-called good moral character-as a
conductor but not as an attorney-know that that latter illustration is not far fetched, but that in truth it is enacted in Indiana
every week of the year.
We are concerned (as was pointed out in the Walls case4"
with his good moral character as an attorney and not in any
other capacity. Do we have to prove to anyone at this date that
one who wants to represent himself to be an attorney, when he is
not one in fact, is wanting in moral fibre to the extent that his
mere application ought to bar his admission? That instead of
practicing law such a one is practicing fraud?
And the facts prove that that is more than idle theory. I
was chairman of the Committee on Grievances of the Lake
County Bar Association for a year. I investigated fourteen or
fifteen complaints, and not one involved an attorney who should
have been admitted in the first instance; each one being very
deficient in legal education. During the past year I have communicated with men in the larger cities of the state who have
been active on local grievance committees and although it is impossible to get any actual statistics, all of those men who replied
to the inquiry answered that almost without exception their difficulties came from men from that same class.
4173 Ind. 95.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

But more important than those observations are the two or
three authentic instances in which a jury has specifically decided
that an applicant for admission to the bar without legal education is not a person of good moral character. What better evidence could there be than that public opinion on the question has
progressed since 1852?
The conclusion must be that legislation, or court regulation,
on the subject would be constitutional.
This conclusion can in truth be supported upon any one of
three propositions: first, that the constitution gives a "right" to
one being a voter and of good moral character, but as we have
seen such a right is subject to reasonable regulation in any
event, and the phrase "good moral character" is open to present
day application, and on either of the latter grounds there would
be permitted a requirement of legal education, either as a reasonable regulation, or as part of "good moral character"; second,
that the constitution sets a minimum standard, or imposes but
two conditions for admission to practice which may be added
to: there is ample support for this view in the proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention and in the first two cases decided,
but on that point it probably must be conceded that those cases
are impliedly overruled by the last two. If the proposition were
to be re-examined, however, a very forceful argument could be
made to sustain the proposition that the first cases were right
and the last ones wrong. After all is said and done the substance
of the proceedings of the convention seem to be that it intended
to make "voting" and "good moral character" two preliminary
conditions only; that is, if one possessed those qualifications he
was then "entitled to admission," or to present himself for examination. On the basis of the convention proceedings a court
could very reasonably take that view. On the other hand one
may take the third interpretation, that is, that the constitution
sets a maximum standard, and reach the same result. One may
say quite categorically today that one who wishes to attempt
to practice law without requisite knowledge and training has not
a good moral character. It is after all a question of common
honesty upon which reasonable men cannot differ.
There remains to be considered briefly the facts and the policy
urged against the proposed change. Those opposed to it say that
we have got along for one hundred years or more without it,
why change? And the short answer to that is that it isn't so.
We have not got along without it. Our law has been adminis-
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tered during all those years, in so far as it has been properly,
or approximately so administered, by men who through selfeducation and legal education in easier doses have been learned
in the law. Legal education since 1816 has in fact at every
instance been a condition precedent to every success on the
bench or at the bar. You can as well have an airplane without
an engine and wings, as you can have a real lawyer or judge
without a wide and deep knowledge of the law. You can as well
eat chicken without having it, as you can practice law without
knowing any law.
It is true that *e have put up with many miserable failures
on the bench and at the bar, and to the point that we have become so calloused that in some quarters at least we have fatalistic
inhibition as a result. Our environment seems to some to have
so strong a hold on our characters that we believe it futile to
attempt to rise above it. We cannot expect progress from that
class, any more than we can expect the peasantry of China to
set up a new order of things there. But we can expect that this
groap shall say that we are through with the injustice which
results from the old system, and that this group shall take the
lead in making legal education not only the insurer of success
at the bar, but make it a prerequisite for admission.
And have we not already answered the second argument: that
legal education was unnecessary eighty years ago, when the constitution was adopted, therefore it is unnecessary now? Again
it was as necessary then as now. It is true that its form has
changed. Then it was obtained in a law office, and in the practice; now for the most part it is obtained in law schools and the
practice. Then law schools were few and far between; for the
most part inaccessible, and on the whole offered little real advantage over office study. Then the body of the law was slight
and simple as compared to its present proportions and complexities. Then lawyers and judges were dealing with law in frontier civilization; times have changed. And with it have changed
the amount and content of law and the manner in which a student is to acquire knowledge of it. But the very real necessity
for such a knowledge and the acquisition of the power of legal
reasoning for the purpose of applying it is increasingly apparent. Eighty years ago a student learned his law primarily
in the practice, and to a certain extent, at the expense of his
clients. Today, the question fairly is: is there any real necessity
for a young lawyer learning all of his law at the expense of his
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clients? The obvious answer is no. Opportunities for his education at his own expense and that of the state are so plentiful,
that the old system has been abandoned in all but rare instances.
Indiana is alone in its present situation and the glaring ugliness of it is graphically set out in the article by Richard Tinkham in the June issue of the Indiana Law Journal. Three of
our ninety-two counties make good faith efforts to regulate admissions to the bar! Standards of education in other states have
been set higher and higher each year. Standards in law schools
have had a corresponding rise. Everywhere else there has been
action vitalizing the, self-evident truth that a knowledge of the
law is the lawyer's sole tool. Other states will not allow him to
attempt to work without it.
And then it is urged that such standards would keep out the
exceptional individual, too poor to secure the necessary education. If that were true it might well be said that such a case
falls in that rather large class of cases where "it's just too bad."
Any rule which is in any real sense a rule may seem unjust in its
application to exceptional cases, but the latter must bow to the
obvious general benefits which flow from the application of the
rule in the 9,999 cases out of the 10,000. But the real answer
again is, it isn't so! There is no exceptional individual today,
however poor he may be who cannot with comparative ease and
generous assistance acquire an education. If he have the mind
and the ambition which the phrase "exceptional individual" imports his education is assured him.
This last semester there were 167 students in the Indiana
University School of Law. It is estimated that at least sixty per
cent of them earn at least one-half of their own expenses; that
an additional fifteen or twenty per cent earn a part and from five
to ten per cent earn all of their expenses. I, myself, have known
young men who have not only worked their way through school
but have helped support a widowed mother and smaller children
in the family. Such an experience is not an unmixed blessing,
but it can be done.
And as a last recourse a young man can get married and have
his wife put him through school!
Finally it is argued that there is created a monopoly and that
such a program is wrong on principle. Which on the latter
point at least gets us up into the insecure realm of philosophy.
But we can answer by merely restating the argument for them;
it creates another monopoly, and is wrong on an assumed principle.
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Both propositions involve the rule of regulation as against
the principle of freedom of action; government against individualism. But certainly those who oppose it would admit the
validity of some regulation, (that is, they would keep out the
confirmed embezzler, for example) and there remains only the
extent of the application of such a concession. Which after all
gets back to the question, are the present evils sufficient to call
for action? How much public security must we sacrifice to
individual freedom: how much of the latter to the former? Obviously different individuals and different times will give varying
answers. All we can do is to measure the temper of the time,
for as has been truly said, "Man acts from adequate motives
relative to his interest, and not on metaphysical speculations."
Is the public misled by incompetent attorneys? Is the public
here incapable of self-protection? Is there an evil to be remedied? From what has been said the answers to the first and
last are self-evident. While it certainly is true that under our
present situation we license an attorney; we make him an officer
of the court; in all truth we make him an attorney in contemplation of law, when he may not be one in fact. We deceive the
public and the public is in truth deceived. It has very little
means of knowledge and can have none. As in all other cases
where that disparity exists between individuals we regulate the
conduct of the one in the position to impose on the other. We
fully regulate the licensing of all other professions and businesses where the individual represents himself to be possessed
of special knowledge or ability.
It seems too plain for words that if individualism clings to
admission to the legal profession as its last foothold that the
loneliness of the position alone disproves its validity. Is there
not the same evil present which prompts (with almost universal
approval) regulation of doctors, dentists, pharmacists, teachers,
and every other profession?
The uniqueness of our position carries with it a sting of reproach, not only to ourselves, but to all of the people of the state.
But it stings deeper this body than any other. We shoid be the
leaders in correcting the evil, and as a result are we not accessories to the misrepresentations and the failures of justice, which
result from the present situation? We concede that we are
leaders: but we fail to lead. If this association has any real
sense of its obligations to itself and the people of the State of
Indiana it will pledge itself to devote all of its energies to the
passage of this act.

